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Newest epidode – hear now.
DOUG. Busts, shutdowns, Samba, and GitHub.
All that, and extra, on the Bare Safety podcast.
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Welcome to the podcast, everyone.
I’m Doug Aamoth; he’s Paul Ducklin.
Paul, how do you do immediately, Sir?
DUCK. I’m very nicely, Douglas.
DOUG. Allow us to begin the present with our Tech Historical past section – that is an attention-grabbing one.
This week, on 01 February 1982, the Intel 80286 16-bit microprocessor was launched, and went on to change into a mainstay in IBM PC/AT computer systems for years.
Apparently, Intel didn’t count on the 286 for use for private computer systems, and designed a chip with multitasking and multi-user methods in thoughts.
DUCK. Its major use, as you say, was the PC/AT, the “Superior Expertise” laptop from IBM, which was mainly designed to run DOS.
Though DOS is proscribed to 1MB of RAM (or 640KB RAM and the remainder ROM), you could possibly have additional reminiscence, and you could possibly use it for issues like…
…keep in mind HIMEM.SYS, and RAM caches, all of that stuff?
Besides that as a result of Intel had safety in thoughts, bless their hearts, once they designed the 286…
…when you had switched from the mode the place it ran like an 8086 into the super-powerful so-called “protected mode”, *you couldn’t swap again*.
When you flipped into the mode that allow you to entry your HIMEM or your RAMDISK, you had been caught.
You couldn’t return and keep on working DOS!
And IBM really jury-rigged their PC – you despatched this particular command to (consider it or not) the keyboard controller, and the keyboard controller mainly rebooted the CPU.
Then, when the CPU began up once more, the BIOS mentioned, “Oh, that’s not a real reboot, that’s a sneaky ‘swap again illegally to actual mode’ reboot,” [LAUGHTER] and it went again to the place you had been in DOS.
So the issue is, it was super-inefficient.
The opposite factor with the 286, although it may entry 16MB RAM in whole, is that, similar to the 8086, it may solely work on a most of 64KB at a time.
So the 64-kilobyte restrict was nonetheless mainly wired into the DNA of that 286 microprocessor.
It was majestically and needlessly, because it turned out, difficult.
It’s type of like a product that was super-cool, however didn’t actually match a necessity out there on the time, sadly.
DOUG. Nicely, let’s begin in on our first tales.
We now have a two-pack – it’s crime time.
Let’s discuss shutdowns and lock-ups, beginning with the FBI shutting down the Hive ransomware servers in the end.
That’s excellent news!
Hive ransomware servers shut down ultimately, says FBI
DUCK. It does appear so, doesn’t it, Doug?
Though we have to say, as we at all times do, primarily, that “cybercrime abhors a vacuum”.
Sadly, different operators steam in when one lot get busted…
…or if all that occurs is that their servers get taken down, and the precise individuals working them don’t get recognized and arrested, sometimes what occurs is that they preserve their heads beneath the parapet for a short while, after which they simply pop up elsewhere.
Generally they reinvent the previous model, simply to thumb their nostril on the world.
Generally they’d come again with a brand new identify.
So the factor with Hive – it seems that the FBI had infiltrated the Hive ransomware gang, presumably by taking on some sysadmin’s account, and apparently that occurred in the midst of 2022.
However, as we now have mentioned on the podcast earlier than, with the darkish internet, the truth that you have got somebody’s account and you may log in as them…
…you continue to can’t simply search for the IP variety of the server you’re connecting to, as a result of the darkish internet is hiding that.
So plainly, for the primary a part of this operation, the FBI weren’t really in a position to determine the place the servers had been, though apparently they had been in a position to get free decryption keys for fairly numerous individuals – I feel a number of hundred victims.
In order that was fairly excellent news!
After which, whether or not it was some operational intelligence blunder, whether or not they simply acquired fortunate, or… we don’t know, however plainly finally they did work out the place the servers had been, and bingo!
Shutdown!
DOUG. OK, excellent.
After which our second of those crime tales.
We’ve acquired a Dutch suspect in custody, charged for not simply private information theft, however [DOOM-LADEN VOICE] “megatheft”, as you place it. Paul:
Dutch suspect locked up for alleged private information megathefts
DUCK. Sure!
Plainly his “job” was… he finds information, or buys information from different individuals, or breaks into websites and steals enormous tranches of information himself.
Then he slices-and-dices it in varied methods, and places it up on the market on the darkish internet.
He was caught as a result of the corporate that appears after TV licensing in Austria (loads of European international locations require you to have a allow to personal and function a TV set, which primarily funds nationwide tv)… these databases just about have each family, minus just a few.
The Austrian authorities turned conscious that there was a database up on the market on the darkish internet that regarded very very like the type of information you’d get – the fields, and the best way all the things was formatted… “That appears like ours, that appears like Austrian TV licences. My gosh!”
In order that they did a extremely cool factor, Doug.
They did an undercover buy-back, and within the technique of doing so, they really acquired an excellent deal with on the place the particular person was: “It seems to be like this particular person might be in Amsterdam, within the Netherlands.”
And they also acquired in contact with their pals within the Dutch police, and the Dutch had been in a position to get warrants, and discover out extra, and do some raids, and bust any person for this crime.
Maybe unusually, they acquired the best from the courtroom, primarily, to carry the man incommunicado – it was all a secret.
He was simply locked away, didn’t get bail – in actual fact, they’ve nonetheless acquired a pair extra months, I feel, that they will maintain him.
So he’s not getting out.
I’m assuming they’re frightened that [A] he’s acquired a great deal of cryptocurrency mendacity round, so he’d most likely do a runner, and [B] he’d most likely tip off all his compadres within the cyberunderworld.
It additionally appeared that he was making loads of cash out of it, as a result of he’s additionally being charged with cash laundering – the Dutch police declare to have proof that he personally cashed out someplace within the area of half-a-million euros of cryptocoins final 12 months.
So there you’re!
Numerous derring-do in an investigation, as soon as once more.
DOUG. Sure, certainly.
OK, this can be a traditional “We’ll keep watch over that!” sort of story.
Within the meantime, we now have a Samba logon bug that reminds us why cryptographic agility is so necessary:
Critical Safety: The Samba logon bug attributable to outdated crypto
DUCK. It’s a reminder that when the cryptographic gurus of the world say, “XYZ algorithm is now not match for goal, please cease utilizing it”, snd the 12 months is – let’s say – the mid 2000s…
…it’s nicely price listening!
Be sure that there isn’t some legacy code that drags on, since you kind-of suppose, “Nobody will use it.”
It is a logon course of in Microsoft Home windows networking which depends on the MD5 hashing algorithm.
And the issue with the MD5 hashing algorithm is it’s a lot too simple to create two recordsdata which have precisely the identical hash.
That shouldn’t occur!
For me to get two separate inputs which have precisely the identical hash ought to take me, on my laptop computer, roughly 10,000 years…
DOUG. Roughly! [LAUGHS]
DUCK. Roughly.
Nevertheless, only for that article alone, utilizing instruments developed by a Dutch cryptographer for his Grasp’s thesis again in 2007, I created *ten* colliding MD5 hash-pair recordsdata…
…in a most of 14 seconds (for one in all them) and a minimal of below half a second.
So, billions of instances sooner than it’s imagined to be potential.
You’ll be able to due to this fact be completely certain that the MD5 hash algorithm *merely doesn’t dwell as much as its promise*.
That’s the core of this bug.
Principally, in the midst of the authentication course of, there’s a component that claims, “You realize what, we’re going to create this super-secure authentication token from information equipped by the person, and utilizing a secret key equipped by the person. So, what we’ll do is we’ll first do an MD5 hash of the information to make it good and brief, after which we’ll create the authentication code *based mostly on that 128-bit hash.”
In principle, in the event you’re an attacker, you’ll be able to create different enter information *that may provide you with the identical authentication hash*.
And meaning you’ll be able to persuade the opposite finish, “Sure, I *should* know the key key, in any other case how may I probably create the best authentication code?”
The reply is: you cheat in the midst of the method, by feeding in information that simply occurs to provide you with the identical hash, which is what the authentication code is predicated upon.
The MD5 algorithm died years in the past, however but it lives on – and it shouldn’t!
So the repair is straightforward.
Samba simply mentioned, “What we’re going to do is, if you wish to use this previous algorithm, any more, you’ll have to soar by way of hoops to show it on. And if that breaks issues, and if out of the blue you’ll be able to’t log into your personal community since you had been utilizing weak safety with out realising it… that’s the worth we’re all prepared to pay.”
And I agree with that.
DOUG. OK, it’s model 4.17.5 that now forces these two choices, so head on the market and decide that up in the event you haven’t already.
And final, however definitely not least, we’ve acquired code-signing certificates stolen from GitHub.
However there’s a silver lining right here, luckily:
GitHub code-signing certificates stolen (however will probably be revoked this week)
DUCK. It’s been fairly the few months for cloud breaches and potential provide chain assaults.
DOUG. Critically!
DUCK. “Oh pricey, stolen signing keys”… GitHub realised this had occurred on 07 December 2022.
Now, hats off to them, they realised the very day after the crooks had acquired in.
The issue is that they hadn’t acquired into wander round – plainly their skill to get in was based mostly on the truth that they may obtain non-public GitHub repositories.
This isn’t a breach of the GitHub methods, or the GitHub infrastructure, or how GitHub shops recordsdata – it’s simply that GitHub’s code on GitHub… a few of the stuff that was imagined to be non-public acquired downloaded.
And as we’ve spoken about earlier than, the issue when supply code repositories which might be imagined to be non-public get downloaded…
…the issue is that, surprisingly typically, these repositories might need stuff in that you just don’t wish to make public.
For instance, passwords to different providers.
And, importantly, the code-signing keys – your signet ring, that you just use to place your little seal within the wax of this system that you just really construct.
Even in the event you’re an open supply mission, you’re not going to place your code-signing keys within the public model of the supply code!
In order that was GitHub’s worry: “Oh pricey. We discovered the crooks nearly instantly, however they got here in, they grabbed the code, they went… thus, injury already achieved.”
It took them fairly a very long time, practically two months, to determine what they may say about this.
Or at the least it took two months till they mentioned something about it.
And it sounds as if the one issues that may affect clients that did get stolen had been certainly code-signing keys.
Solely two tasks had been affected.
One is the supply code editor often called “Atom”, GitHub Atom.
That was mainly outmoded in most builders’ lives by Visible Studio Code [LAUGHS], so the entire mission acquired discontinued in the midst of 2022, and its final safety replace was December 2022.
So that you most likely shouldn’t be utilizing Atom anyway.
And the excellent news is that, as a result of they weren’t going to be constructing it any extra, the certificates concerned…
…most of them have already expired.
And in the long run, GitHub discovered, I feel, that there are solely three stolen certificates that had been really nonetheless legitimate, in different phrases, that crooks may really use for signing something.
And people three certificates had been all encrypted.
Certainly one of them expired on 04 January 2023, and it doesn’t appear that the crooks did crack that password, as a result of I’m not conscious of any malware that was signed with that certificates within the hole between the crooks getting in and the certificates expiring one month later.
There’s a second certificates that expires the day we’re recording the podcast, Wednesday, 01 February 2022; I’m not conscious of that one having been abused, both.
The one outlier in all of this can be a code-signing certificates that, sadly, doesn’t expire till 2027, and that’s for signing Apple packages.
So GitHub has mentioned to Apple, “Be careful for something that comes alongside that’s signed with that.”
And from 02 February 2022, the entire code-signing certificates that had been stolen (even those which have already expired) will probably be revoked.
So it seems to be as if this can be a case of “all’s nicely that ends nicely.”
In fact, there’s a minor side-effect right here, and that’s that in the event you’re utilizing the GitHub Desktop product, or in the event you’re nonetheless utilizing the Atom editor, then primarily GitHub is revoking signing keys *for their very own apps*.
Within the case of the GitHub Desktop, you completely must improve, which you have to be doing anyway.
Paradoxically, as a result of Atom is discontinued… in the event you desperately must proceed utilizing it, you really must downgrade barely to the newest model of the app that was signed with a certificates that isn’t going to get revoked.
I’ll have made that sound extra difficult than it truly is…
…however it’s a foul search for GitHub, as a result of they did get breached.
It’s one other unhealthy search for GitHub that included within the breach had been code-signing certificates.
Nevertheless it’s an excellent search for GitHub that, by the best way they managed these certificates. most of them had been now not of any use.
Two of the three that could possibly be harmful can have expired by the point you hearken to this podcast, and the final one, in your phrases, Doug, “they’re actually maintaining a tally of.”
Additionally, they’ve revoked all of the certificates, regardless of the very fact that there’s a knock-on impact on their very own code.
So, they’re primarily disowning their very own certificates, and a few of their very own signed packages, for the better good of all.
And I feel that’s good!
DOUG. Alright, good job by GitHub.
And, because the solar begins to set on our present for immediately, it’s time to listen to from one in all our readers.
Nicely, in the event you keep in mind from final week, we’ve been making an attempt to assist out reader Steven roll his personal USB-key-based password supervisor.
Primarily based on his quandary, reader Paul asks:
Why not simply retailer your passwords on a USB keep on with {hardware} encryption and a keypad… in a transportable password supervisor reminiscent of KeePass? No must invent your personal, simply shell out a couple of dollars and preserve a backup someplace, like in a secure.
DUCK. Not a foul concept in any respect. Doug!
I’ve been that means to buy-and-try a type of particular USB drives… you get hard-disk sized ones (though they’ve SSDs generally nowadays), the place there’s loads of room for a keypad on the highest of the drive.
However you even get USB sticks, and so they sometimes have two rows of 5 keys or two rows of six keys subsequent to one another.
It’s not like these commodity USB drives that, say, “Consists of free encryption software program,” which is on the stick and you may then set up it in your laptop.
The concept is that it’s like BitLocker or FileVault or LUKS, like we spoke about final week.
There’s a full-disk encryption layer *contained in the drive enclosure itself*, and as quickly as you unplug it, even in the event you don’t unmount it correctly, in the event you simply yank it out of the pc…
…when the ability goes down, the important thing will get flushed from reminiscence and the factor will get locked once more.
I assume the burning query is, “Nicely, why doesn’t everybody simply use these as USB keys, as a substitute of normal USB gadgets?”
And there are two causes: the primary is that it’s a trouble, and the opposite drawback is that they’re a lot, rather more costly than common USB keys.
So I feel, “Sure, that’s an amazing concept.”
The issue is, as a result of they’re not mainstream merchandise, I don’t have any I can suggest – I’ve by no means tried one.
And you’ll’t simply go into the common PC store and purchase one.
So if any listeners have a model, or a kind, or a selected class of such product that they use and like…
…we’d love to listen to about it, so do tell us!
DOUG. OK, nice.. I like somewhat crowd-sourcing, individuals serving to individuals.
Thanks very a lot, Paul, for sending that in.
When you’ve got an attention-grabbing story, remark or query you’d wish to submit, we’d like to learn it on the podcast.
You’ll be able to e-mail suggestions@sophos.com, touch upon any one in all our articles, or hit us up on social: @NakedSecurity.
That’s our present for immediately – thanks very a lot for listening.
For Paul Ducklin, I’m Doug Aamoth, reminding you till subsequent time to…
BOTH. Keep safe!
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